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Artificial Insemination: A New Scientific Achievement Gives
Rise to a Need for New Legislation in Texas
The growing use of artificial insemination as a means of providing aid
to childless couples' has engendered new and as yet unresolved legal prob-
lems. The answers to these problems can best be provided by the legisla-
tures of the various states. In the absence of such legislative guidelines,
however, the courts have been compelled to resolve the legal issues within
the context of the common law. The purpose of this Note is to demon-
strate the inadequacy of the common law as applied to the legal issues
which arise through the use of artificial insemination and to point out the
need for effective legislation. This purpose is best achieved by an exam-
ination of the existing case precedent and the applicable Texas law of
legitimacy and adultery.
I. THE CONCEPT OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
The medical definitions of artificial insemination' are varied and of
little use to the layman. In simple terms "artificial insemination attempts
to impregnate a female without the presence of a male body."4 It is im-
portant to note, however, the differences between the two methods of ar-
tificial insemination. Artificial Insemination Homologous (A.I.H.) is the
insemination of the female with the semen of her husband when inter-
course is impossible because of physiological or psychological reasons. Ar-
tificial Insemination Heterologous (A.I.D.) is the insemination of the wife
with the semen of a donor other than the husband.
While it is estimated that between one-third and two-thirds of the arti-
ficial insemination cases are of the A.I.H. variety,' the only serious legal
problems raised by this method are those involving the standard of medical
competency required' and whether this form of artificial insemination con-
' In 1960 it was estimated that between 5,000 and 7,000 births per year were taking place
as a result of artificial insemination. Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemination in the Treat-
ment of Sterility, 15 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY 767, 769 (1960). See also Verkauf,
Artificial Insemination: Progress, Polemics, and Confusion--An Appraisal of Current Medico-Legal
Status, 3 HousT. L. REV. 277 (1966). The importance of artificial insemination to childless couples
is somewhat revealed by the fact that the number of couples wanting to adopt children tradi-
tionally outnumbers the available children by 10 to 1. There is some evidence, however, that this
trend has reversed in recent years. See Katz, Community Decision-Makers and the Promotion of
Values in the Adoption of Children, 4 J. FAMILY L. 7, 8-9 (1964).
2 See note 43 infra, and accompanying text.
' Artificial insemination is the "introduction of semen into the female genital tract by me-
chanical means rather than by coitus." Verkauf, Artificial Insemination: Progress, Polemics, and
Confusion--An Appraisal of Current Medico-Legal Status, 3 HousT. L. REV. 277, 277 (1966).
"Artificial insemination then is an attempt to further the chances of and facilitate the encounter
between the female germ cells-the ova-and the male seed-the semen-by artificial means." A.
SCHELLEN, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION IN THE HUMAN 6 (1957).
' Note, People v. Sorensen: Artificial Insemination Gives Birth to Real Legal Problems in Cali-
fornia, 4 CALIF. W.L. REV. 177, 177 (1968).
aWeinberger, A Partial Solution to Legitimacy Problems Arising From the Use of Artificial
Insemination, 35 IND. L.J. 143 (1960).
'See Note, Artificial Insemination Versus Adoption, 34 VA. L. REv. 822 (1948).
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stitutes a consummation of the marriage." A.I.D., s on the other hand,
creates a myriad of legal, medical,9 and theological'0 problems. The most
significant legal questions examined by the courts to date concern the
legitimacy of the resulting child and whether the insemination process
itself is adulterous.
II. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: A LooK AT THE CASES
The discussion of questions of adultery and illegitimacy in the early
Canadian case of Orford v. Orford" indicated that a woman participating
in artificial insemination was guilty of adultery and that the child resulting
from the insemination was illegitimate. Although the court conceded that
there had been no intercourse in the natural sense of the word," it reasoned
that the artificial insemination could be considered to be intercourse be-
cause the "essence of the offense of adultery"'" was present. This decision
evidenced the traditional concept of adultery in that the moral turpitude
(or the lack of the same) was less important than the fact that a "false
strain of blood" had been introduced into the husband's family." It is im-
portant to note that the court did not feel that the lack of consent by
the husband to the artificial insemination was an important factor.
'In the English case of L. v. L., [1949] 1 All E.R. 141, an annulment was granted on the
grounds that although the wife had been artificially inseminated with the semen of the husband
the marriage had never been technically consummated. The resulting child was consequently declared
to be illegitimate.
' Because the scope of this discussion is an examination of the legal questions raised by artificial
insemination heterologous (A.I.D.) any further reference to "artificial insemination" pertains to
A.I.D.
'The British Medical Association stated its disapproval of A.I.D. in Legal Status of Euthanasia,
Abortion, and Artificial Insemination, BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, July 30, 1960, at 365. For a
discussion of the medical ethics involved in artificial insemination see Guttmacher, Test-Tube Pa-
ternity, THE NATION, March 29, 1958, at 270. Precautionary steps to be followed by a physician
practicing artificial insemination are noted in E. NOVAK & G. JONES, NOVAK'S TExmooK OF
GYNECOLOGY 656 (1961), and include at least three to six months of prior counseling with the
husband and wife, at least one psychiatric interview, knowledge of the husband's sterility for at
least one year, prior attempts to treat the husband's sterility, establishment of the wife's fertility,
and evidence that the husband, rather than the wife, initiated the action. See generally Christakos,
Human Genetic Manipulation; Fact and Fancy, DUKE ALUMNI REGISTER, Sept. 1968, at 1.
" While the theological considerations of artificial insemination are subject to rapid change and
even variation within a given religious sect, some general observations may be made. The Roman
Catholic Church apparently condemns both A.I.D. and A.I.H. as illicit and unnatural. See Hassett,
Freedom and Order Before God: A Catholic View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1170 (1956); Kelly, Arti-
ficial Insemination: Theological and Natural Law Aspects, 33 U. DET. L.J. 135 (1956).'The
Anglican Church, on the other hand, apparently accepts A.I.H. while voicing disapproval of A.I.D.
See Committee Report, The Family in Contemporary Society, in THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE
1958, at 2.142 (1958). No official Jewish or Protestant view has been manifested and decisions con-
cerning artificial insemination are apparently left to the individual. See Rackman, Morality in
Medico-Legal Problems: A Jewish View, 31 N.Y.U.L. Ruv. 1205 (1956); Ramsey, Freedom and
"Responsibility in Medical' and Sex Ethics: A Protestant View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1189 (1956).
See generally Smith, Genetic Manipulation: The End of an Illusion, DUKE ALUMNI REGISTER,
Septenber, 1968, at 8.
I 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
1 The court's discussion of artificial nsemination in Orford must be considered dicta, however,
since the court did not believe the wife's story and assumed its truth only for the sake of dis-
cussion.
" Virtually every definition of the term "adultery" contains a requirement of "intercourse."
"Adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married* person with a person other than the
offender's husband or wife." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 71 (4th ed. 1951).
1458 D.L.R. 251, 258 (1921).
"' See Note, Artificial Insemination: A Parvenu Intride (m Ancient Law, 58 YALE L.J. 457
(1949).
Conversely, an Illinois court in Hoch v. Hoch" treated the lack of the
husband's consent as a critical factor. The court held that the wife's par-
ticipation in artificial insemination without her husband's consent consti-
tuted adultery and that the husband was entitled to a divorce on that
ground. From the court's discussion it appears that if consent had been
given by the husband the A.I.D. would not have been adulterous. In the
later Illinois case of Doornbos v. Doornbos,"' however, the Hoch rationale
was not adopted. The wife was awarded a divorce on the ground of the
husband's drunkenness, but the court went on to note that A.I.D. either
with or without the husband's consent constitutes adultery and is against
good morals and public policy. The wife's testimony that the couple's child
was produced by artificial insemination was held to be sufficient grounds
for declaring the child to be illegitimate. Furthermore, because of the illeg-
itimacy of the child the husband was denied visitation rights."
In Strnad v. Strnad" a New York court resolved the issue of the child's
legitimacy following artificial insemination upon the unique theory that
such a child is "potentially adopted or semi-adopted" by the husband of the
mother."0 In granting visitation rights to the husband subsequent to the
separation of the couple the court held that the situation was similar to the
one in which the child is born out of wedlock and legitimized upon the
marriage of the parents.
This "semi-adoption" principle was later rejected by the New York
Supreme Court in Gursky v. Gursky." There, despite the presence of a
child born to the mother as a result of artificial insemination, the court
annulled the marriage on the ground that it had never been consummated.
In declaring the child to be illegitimate the court stated that the informa-
tion in the birth certificate is "neither controlling nor determinative of the
parental status of the parties nor of the status of the infant."22 The court
noted that the legitimation of children is the task of the legislature and the
fact that it has not acted to legitimate A.I.D. children implies a desire to
consider them illegitimate."3 The court went on to hold the husband liable
for support payments, however, under the principles of implied contract
and equitable estoppel because he had consented to the insemination.
The recent California case of People v. Sorensen 4 represents the most
enlightened approach to the problems posed by artificial insemination.
The court relied heavily on the public policy favoring legitimacy to up-
16 No. 44-c-9307 (Ill. Cir. Ct., 1948) (unreported).
"7No. 54-s-14981 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., 1954) (unreported).
" An opportunity to resolve the inconsistencies of the Illinois courts was lost when the appeal
from Doornbos was dismissed on procedural grounds. The appeal, taken by the state as parens
patriae, emphasized the presumption of legitimacy and argued that the illegitimate status unjustly
deprived the child of its right to support and inheritance from the husband. Doornbos v. Doornbos,
12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
'9 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
2078 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
2' 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
2" 242 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
2"The 1964 New York case of Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 866, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835
(Sup. Ct. 1964), cited Gursky with approval but did not clearly indicate whether the two children
of the couple were being held to be illegitimate.
24437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
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hold the conviction of the husband for failure to support a child born to
his wife as a result of artificial insemination. The Sorensen court held that
"no valid public purpose is served by stigmatizing an artificially conceived
child as illegitimate."'" In addition, the court labeled the contentions that
the doctor and the wife, and/or the donor and the wife, had committed
adultery by the process of artificial insemination as "patently absurd."'"
Although the decision hinged on the court's interpretation of the particular
California penal statute involved,"7 it is significant to note the court's
broad statement that "[i]n the absence of legislation prohibiting artificial
insemination, the offspring of [the husband's] valid marriage to the child's
mother was lawfully begotten and was not the product of an illicit or
adulterous relationship."'" The reasoning of Sorensen is probably applicable
in whatever context the question of artificial insemination is raised and
should serve as persuasive precedent "not only for the California court in
other cases, but for other state courts as well.""
III. TEXAS LAW RELEVANT TO ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
The Texas Law of Legitimacy and Adultery. The legitimacy of the child
produced by artificial insemination raises several problems. If the child
were declared illegitimate his right to support," inheritance,a" and work-
men's compensation" from the husband of the mother would be unavail-
able. Furthermore, any decision concerning the legitimacy of an A.I.D.
child must necessarily be considered against the overriding doctrine that a
child born during the lawful marriage of the husband and wife is presumed
to be the legitimate child of the couple." This presumption is one of the
strongest known to law and is rebuttable only by proof that the husband
was impotent or did not have access to the wife during the period of ges-
tation." The presumption is given even greater weight by the evidentiary
rule that the testimony of the husband or wife may not be received "for
25437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
" Id. The court noted that, in fact, the doctor may be the wife's husband or even a woman
and that the donor may be "a thousand miles away" or even dead at the time of the insemination.
2CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1955). The relevant portion of the section provides that
"[a] father of either a legitimate or illegitimate minor child who willfully omits without lawful
excuse to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance or other remedial care for
his child is guilty of a misdemeanor .... " Subsequent to the decision in Sorensen the California
legislature amended Penal Code 270 to include children conceived through artificial insemination.2"437 P.2d 495, 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 13 (1968).
20 Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 127, 139 (1968).
U0Beaver v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 179, 256 S.W. 929 (1923).
3See Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 116 S.W. 43 (1909). See also TEx. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 42 (1956).
"Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 138 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), error dismissed,
judgment correct.
"aByrd v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 275 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), error 'ref. n.r.e. See gen-
erally Comment, Illegitimacy in Texas, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 599 (1959). The Illinois court in Ohlson
v. Ohlson, No. 53-s-1410 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., 1954) (unreported), made significant
use of the presumption of legitimacy in relation to artificial insemination. The husband's visitation
rights were upheld when the administering doctor testified that it was not likely, but possible,
that the husband was the natural father of the child. The court held that this testimony was in-
sufficient to overcome the presumption that a child born during the continuance of a lawful mar-
riage is legitimate.
'
4 Marckley v. Marcklcy, 189 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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NOTES
the purpose of showing non-access or otherwise assailing the legitimacy of
the child."' The strength of this presumption reflects the strong public
policy in Texas favoring legitimacy.'
Adultery in Texas is defined as "the living together and carnal inter-
course with each other, or habitual carnal intercourse with each other
without living together, of a man and woman when either is lawfully mar-
ried to some other person."3 In light of this definition it would seem clear
that artificial insemination could not be considered an adulterous act in
Texas. The wife cannot be said to be "living together" with either the
donor or the doctor since "living together" requires that the parties reside
together in the same place. 8 Even if the mechanics of artificial insemina-
tion could be held to satisfy the "carnal intercourse" requirement of the
statute, a single instance of insemination would not constitute "living to-
gether""9 and even occasional instances would not amount to "habitual"
intercourse." But, despite the apparent compatibility of artificial insemina-
tion with the Texas law of adultery and illegitimacy legislative guidelines
may be necessary to shape the policy decisions which the courts must make
in this area.
Proposed Texas Legislation. The Texas legislature may soon have the op-
portunity to enact legislation concerning artificial insemination. The pro-
posed legislation as presently drafted provides:
(a) Where a husband consents to the artificial insemination of his wife,
any resulting child shall be [is] the legitimate child of both of them.
(b) Where a wife is artificially inseminated, no child born as a result of
the insemination shall be regarded as the legitimate child of the donor, unless
he is the consenting husband.4
The lack of legislation at the present time in Texas reflects the serious
problems faced by the states in drafting such statutes. The only guide-
lines present are the information and opinions provided by counselors, doc-
tors, sociologists, religious leaders and anthropologists." Furthermore, im-
portant policy decisions must be made as to whether artificial insemination
is to be encouraged, discouraged, or even prohibited altogether.'
" C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, 1 TEXAs LAW OF EVIDENCE § 90, at 112 (1956), and cases cited
therein.
36 See Home of Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965). See also Krause, Bringing
the Bastard into the Great Society -A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEXAs L. REV.
829 (1966); Smith, Family Law, Anlual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 50, 55 (1967).
"
7 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 499 (1952) (emphasis added).
" Polous v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. 1, 36 S.W.2d 754 (1931); Hay v. State, 92 Tex. Crim. 472,
244 S.W. 531 (1922).
'9 Storey v. State, 94 Tex. Crim. 246, 250 S.W. 427 (1923).
40 Lara v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 84, 217 S.W. 853 (1949). See Cordill v. State, 83 Tex. Crim.
74, 201 S.W. 181 (1918).
41 Proposed legislation Subtitle A, ch. 8, § 8.03.
42 See Note, Artificial Insemination: A Parvenu Intrudes on Ancient Law, 58 YALE L.J. 457
(1949). For suggested provisions to be contained in future legislation see Note, People v. Sorensen:
Artificial Insemination Gives Birth to Real Legal Problems in California, 4 CALIF. W.L. REV. 177,
195 (1968).
" It has been suggested that an attempt to prohibit artificial insemination entirely would meet
possible constitutional obstacles. Note, People v. Sorensen: Artificial Insemination Gives Birth to
Real Legal Problems in California, 4 CALIF. W.L. REV. 177, 195 (1968). See Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Several state legislatures have failed in their attempt to legalize artificial




It has become increasingly apparent that it is "anomalous for a court
to consider artificial insemination within the existing common-law frame-
work of adultery and illegitimacy."" Only through legislative action can
effective steps be taken to resolve the legal issues raised by the practice of
artificial insemination."s The proposed Texas legislation as presently drafted,
however, is seriously deficient in at least one important aspect. While the
statute would clearly define the law concerning artificial insemination with
the husband's consent, the questions arising when consent is lacking (and
the problem of proving such consent) remain unanswered. A statutory re-
quirement of the prior written consent of the husband before the wife may
be artificially inseminated would deter this situation from arising. The
lack of consent should be provided as grounds for divorce by the husband
and a declaration of the illegitimacy of the resulting child. The enactment
of such legislation would provide a means by which the Texas courts could
be removed from the absurd position of having to decide questions of arti-
ficial insemination with legal concepts and statutes created long before the
process of artificial insemination was even imagined.
Lyman G. Hughes
Federal Civil Procedure - "Manufactured" Diversity
Not Permitted
A minor sustained injuries in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania,
where he lived with his mother. With her consent and joinder he petitioned
the Orphans' Court for the appointment of a nonresident guardian of his
estate, conceding that this was an attempt to "manufacture" diversity of
citizenship so that suit could be brought in federal court. The Orphans'
Court appointed the guardian, who instituted an action in a federal district
court to recover for injuries sustained by the minor in the accident. The
minor's mother was joined as plaintiff in her own right under the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction.' The district court dismissed the suit for lack of
legislation which provides that the child resulting from artificial insemination is to be considered
as a "naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 552 (Supp. 1967). See generally Note, Legislative Approach to Artificial Insemination, 53 CORN-
ELL L. REv. 497 (1968).
44 Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 127, 139 (1968).
45 Furthermore, as new scientific advancements are achieved the law must continue to develop.
Of particular importance to artificial insemination are the developments in the field of eugenic con-
trol. At present there is no general consensus on what physical or mental characteristics of the
donor should be considered important. See Hager, Artificial Insemination: Some Practical Consid-
erations for Effective Counseling, 39 N.C.L. REv. 217, 223 (1961). The subject of eugenics is,
however, properly one for future legislation. Note, Artificial Insemination: A Parvenu Intrudes on
Ancient Law, 58 YALE L.J. 457 (1949).
'See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), for a discussion of the scope of
pendent jurisdiction.
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jurisdiction.! Held, affirmed: Diversity of citizenship artificially created by
appointment of a nonresident guardian violates section 1359 of the Judicial
Code.' McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF "MANUFACTURED" DIVERSITY
Despite the Erie v. Tompkins4 requirement that federal courts apply the
same substantive law in diversity cases as would be applied in state courts,
there remain differences which may cause a litigant to prefer one court
over the other. The differences between state and federal procedure, the
reputation of a particular judge, or the general reputation of juries for lib-
eral damage awards are only a few of the reasons for a possible preference
of one court over the other. Where such differences create a preference for
the federal court in a case which initially presents no choice of forum,
parties often attempt to create or "manufacture" diversity by seeking ap-
pointment of a nonresident representative.
Statutes have been enacted to regulate the "manufacture" of diversity
jurisdiction and to relieve federal courts of "business that intrinsically be-
longs to the state courts."' Prior to the enactment of section 1359' in 1948,
the federal statutes which regulated "manufacture" of diversity were con-
tained in section 80' and section 41" of the Judicial Code of 1940. Section
80 required dismissal of an action when the suit did not involve a real and
substantial dispute properly within the jurisdiction of the court or when
the parties to the suit had been improperly or collusively aligned to create
diversity. Section 41 provided that a federal court was to have no jurisdic-
tion of a suit on a promissory note in favor of an assignee unless the suit
could have been prosecuted in federal court if no assignment had been
made. By combining these sections, section 1359 provides that "a district
court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which a party, by as-
signment, or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined
to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." Although section 1359 was in-
tended to be inclusive of the statutes from which it was derived,'" the re-
vision omits the prior "real and substantial" interest requirement of section
80. Specific provision in the new statute for the requirement of a "real and
substantial" interest was not considered necessary due to the assumption
that "any court will dismiss a case not within its jurisdiction when its at-
tention is drawn to the fact, or even on its own motion.""
However, in past interpretations of section 1359 the courts have not in-
'McSparran v. Weist, 270 F. Supp. 421 (D. Pa. 1967).
328 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
4304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964) provides that cases involving a controversy between citizens of dif-
ferent states or between a citizen of a state and an alien and having an amount in controversy of
$10,000 or more may be brought in a federal court.
e Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1941).
728 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
8 36 Star. 1098 (1911).
936 Stat. 1091 (1911).




sisted upon this "real and substantial" interest requirement."2 The words
"improper" or "collusive" have been construed to mean an illegal agree-
ment or understanding between opposing sides in an action rather than an
arrangement by one party to create diversity." Thus, a party's actions were
not thought to be within the statute if such actions were in themselves law-
ful, although the motive in creating diversity was to gain access to federal
court.' Since the citizenship of a personal representative rather than the
beneficiary was generally considered controlling for purposes of determin-
ing diversity," it was possible to appoint a representative, such as an execu-
tor, administrator, or trustee, solely because his citizenship provided diver-
sity, and this would not constitute "improper" or "collusive" conduct
within the meaning of section 1359."'
The Third Circuit followed this interpretation in Jaffe v. Philadelphia
b" Western R.R."7 by sustaining a diversity action under the Pennsylvania
wrongful death and survival statutes although the administratrix was a
nonresident stenographer employed by the widow's attorney. The Jaffe
court held that since there was no attack on the appointment of the ad-
ministratrix as such, the motive that actuated it "is immaterial upon the
question of identity or diversity of citizenship."'" The court felt the ad-
ministratrix was a real party in interest since she had assumed the duty to
sue for and collect the cause of action, although the lawsuit was apparently
the only asset under her management. Jaffe relied on Mecom v. Fitzsim-
inons Drilling Co.," a United States Supreme Court case involving the ap-
pointment of a resident administrator to prevent federal removal jurisdic-
tion from attaching. Mecom held that it was improper to inquire into the
purposes and motives for appointing representatives when the appoint-
ment is lawful in itself. The court reasoned that to do so would amount
to an unwarranted attack on another court's decree. The Jaffe decision and
reasoning was reaffirmed by the Third Circuit in Corabi v. Auto Racing,
Inc." in which the mother of a deceased child had petitioned the state
court for leave to resign as administratrix so that a nonresident administra-
tor could be appointed to obtain diversity of citizenship. The state court
granted the request and, on a certified question2 ' from the federal district
court, the Third Circuit found that "to make use of state law to obtain
diversity jurisdiction . . . is not collusive within the ordinary meaning of
that term."'" Corabi has become a leading case and is followed in most cir-
"Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
3ald. at 788.
"4County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961); Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc.,
264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959); McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954).
Is See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 29 (1963).
"Jamison v. Kammerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1959).
17180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
"aId. at 1012.
"284 U.S. 183 (1931).
"0264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) provides for appeal of otherwise nonappealable orders that
involve a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
264 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1959).
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cuits which have considered the question of "manufactured" diversity of
citizenship."
II. MCSPARRAN V. WEIST
The McSparran court felt that it was impossible to give content to the
"otherwise indefinite and ambiguous words 'improperly' or 'collusively' ,,4
without going into the legislative history of section 13 59. After examining
the reviser's comments," the court held that the requirement of a "real
and substantial" interest must be used to interpret the words "improper"
or "collusive." Thus, parties designated simply to create diversity of citi-
zenship are improperly or collusively named because they have no "real
and substantial" interest in the controversy.
Overruling the Jaffe" and Corabi" cases, the court held in an en banc
decision that under the "real and substantial" interest test the motive for
appointing "straw representatives" must be subjected to careful scrutiny
by the court in each case to determine if there has been improper or col-
lusive action. In McSparran the parties admitted seeking appointment of a
nonresident guardian in a state court proceeding solely to create diversity
of citizenship. This constituted collusion on the face of the record although
the guardian was technically a real party in interest under state law.2
The court distinguished Mecom2" on the ground that section 13 59 was
not involved there. In Mecom appointment of an administrator was effected
not to create federal jurisdiction but to avoid it. The court felt that the
language "to invoke the jurisdiction" in section 13 59 clearly evidenced "a
policy against the creation of federal jurisdiction and not against its avoid-
ance."' By distinguishing Mecom, the court was able to avoid its holding
that to inquire into the motive for appointing a representative when the
appointment is in itself lawful amounts to an unwarranted collateral at-
tack on another court's decree. The court in McSparran, although not
specifically mentioning the Mecom statement, held that this inquiry did not
amount to an attack on another court's decree. The representative remains
in his position but his citizenship is not determinative for purposes of di-
versity. The court felt that, in this situation, he occupies the role of a
guardian ad litem or a next friend "whose function merely is to supply a
party on the record responsible for costs.""
Judge Kalodner's dissent"2 expressed the view that the only issue pre-
sented in the district court and therefore the only question appropriate for
' Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Duggins, 165 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1948); Curb & Gutter
Dist. No. 37 of City of Fayetteville v. Parrish, 110 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1940); Harrison v. Love,
81 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1936); City of Detroit v. Blanchfield, 13 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1926); O'Neil
v. Wolcott Mining Co., 174 F. 527 (8th Cir. 1909).
24402 F.2d 867, 873 (3d Cir. 1968).
" See Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
21 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
2264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).2
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1041 (1950).
29284 U.S. 183 (1931).
3o402 F.2d 867, 875 (3d Cir. 1968).




review was whether the mother's claim could be sustained under the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction. By determining the case on the "threshold
ground" of manufactured diversity, the majority avoided the issue of
pendent jurisdiction. This criticism does not appear to be valid since an
independent claim with requisite jurisdiction is needed to support a pendent
claim." Since the entire action was dismissed in the lower court for lack of
jurisdiction, a valid claim with a jurisdictional base had to be established
prior to consideration of the pendent claim.
Judge Kalodner also felt that "manufactured" diversity was not pro-
hibited by section 1359. He based this conclusion on Judge Biggs' dissent
in Esposito v. Emery, 4 a Third Circuit case decided the same day as Mc-
Sparran. Judge Biggs had concluded that the motive of parties seeking ap-
pointment of a nonresident representative should not be considered and
that the courts should restrict their inquiry to the question of who is the
real party in interest as determined by state law. He contended that in-
quiring into the parties' motive "will open a fertile field for perjurious tes-
timony and lead to great uncertainty.""
III. CONCLUSION
The result in McSparran supports the policy of reducing diversity juris-
diction expressed by section 1359 and recent amendments to the federal
diversity statute.' Although diversity jurisdiction is intended to protect
nonresident litigants from local prejudices,' there seems to be no valid
reason for permitting a person to pursue a local action in federal court
merely because he is able to "manufacture" diversity by having a non-
resident appointed to act for him in a representative capacity. However,
the McSparran court has fashioned a rule of law which may prove difficult
to apply. Since the parties admitted that the purpose of the appointment
was to create diversity, it was not necessary for the court to indicate spe-
cific elements for consideration in determining the validity of the selection
of a representative. It should also be noted that a "real and substantial"
interest will be difficult to determine on a case by case basis. Some non-
resident representatives may be appointed for reasons other than the
"manufacturing" of diversity, yet they may be unable to produce evidence
of a "real and substantial" interest.
Since jurisdiction is a "threshold" question that must be established
prior to litigating the substantive issues of a case, the McSparran rule may
prove time consuming and expensive to the litigants in a federal court.
The court must examine the available evidence to determine the motive for
"See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
'402 F.2d 878, 880 (3d Cir. 1968).
3'Id. at 883.
"'28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964) was amended in 1958 and 1964. In the 1958 amendment, a cor-
poration's citizenship was extended to include the state where it has its principal place of business.
The 1964 amendment extended the citizenship of a nonresident insurer to include the state of resi-
dence of its insured when a direct action is initiated against the insurer and the insured is not
joined as a defendant. In each of these amendments, the legislature restricted litigation of what is
substantially a local action to the state courts.
7 See Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 2 U.S. (5 Cranch) 194 (1809).
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